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AIR TRAVEL BANKS: A VIABLE PUBLIC-PRIVATE 








Financial incentives to develop air services at smaller airports are 
scrutinized by regulatory authorities. This is especially true within the 
European Union with its new guidelines on state aid and consequent 
rulings on the repayment of subsidies provided by airports to airlines that 
violate state aid rules. Private funds used to develop air services are not 
state aid. For this reason, air travel banks (ATBs) might be a promising 
route development tool for smaller airports. This concept builds on the 
idea of binding monetary pledges from air transport users that constitute 
a revenue guarantee for new or expanded air services. This paper 
describes the ATB public-private partnership approach and offers advice 
to airport authorities and regional development agencies considering this 
approach to airport route development without public financing. 





1. INTRODUCTION  
Many airports offer package deals containing financial and non-financial 
incentives to attract new air services. Such incentives are offered to airlines by 
publicly owned as well as by privately owned airports. Incentives may be offered 
for the initial start-up of scheduled services at a smaller airport, but also for 
adding new routes, additional frequencies or operations with larger aircraft. A 
common route development objective at smaller airports is access to a hub 
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airport, i.e. an airport used by an airline as a transfer point for air travel within a 
hub-and-spoke network. Hub access offers the communities in the surroundings 
of a smaller airport not only a point-to-point service into the hub airport, but also 
connecting services to various destinations beyond the hub. 
A common source for monetary incentives is public funding, leading to 
regulatory issues such as a potential violation of state aid rules. Financial 
incentives to develop scheduled air services could also include a guaranteed ticket 
purchase program which is basically a financial commitment of a business 
community to support an air service initiative for a limited time period. Such a 
program requires the formation of an air travel bank (ATB). This paper describes 
the ATB public-private partnership approach to air service development and also 
provides implementation guidelines to airport managers and regional 
development agencies.  
There is related literature on airport route development. STRAIR (2005) 
provides a comprehensive manual on different route development approaches 
which the manual refers to as air service development. Nolan et al. (2005) 
examine various schemes to attract air services in smaller markets, including 
guaranteed revenue approaches like ATB. Each approach is evaluated in terms of 
social welfare and underlying agency costs. For this evaluation, Nolan et al. 
assume the demand for a new air service to be insufficient to allow for a supply-
and-demand based market solution, while in the present paper, sufficient demand 
is assumed to exist, but a start-up aid as temporary incentive is required to allow 
this latent demand to become actual demand. An overview of current airport route 
development practices is given by Halpern/Graham (2015) based on a survey of 
124 airports worldwide. They point out the importance of incentives and risk 
sharing initiatives offered by airport operators, not only to low-cost airlines, but 
to all types of airlines. Allroggen et al. (2013) employ a probit instrument 
variable approach to a sample of 194 European airports to study the factors 
influencing the presence of such incentives. In an earlier study, Martin (2009) 
surveyed 41 smaller airports in the US. A more general perspective on marketing 
tools available to small airports is given by Kramer et al. (2010). Discounts on 
airport charges as frequently used financial incentives are analyzed by Fichert and 
Klophaus (2011) and Jones et al. (2013). Núñez-Sánchez (2015) assesses factors 
affecting the willingness of regional public authorities to support route and traffic 
development. Wittman (2014) studies public funding of airport incentives in the 
US with a focus on the efficacy of the Small Community Air Service 
Development Grant Program (SCASDP). 
The present paper describes ATB programs as a public-private 
partnership approach to airport route development and provides success factors 
for this route development tool that may also serve as guidance to airport 
managers and regional development agencies. It concentrates on the start-up of 
new services at smaller airports. The focus on smaller airports is quite common in 
the literature on airport route development. “Arguably, it is these airports that 
face the greatest challenges in, but also rewards from, attracting airlines and 
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improving the provision of air services” (Halpern/Graham, 2015, p. 215). A small 
airport in the context of the present paper does not mean a general aviation 
airport, but an airport with sufficient infrastructure to offer scheduled air services. 
Further, it is assumed throughout the paper that the considered airport operator is 
a publicly owned entity which is still a valid proposition for most airports around 
the globe.   
 
2. Guaranteed ticket purchase program with air travel bank  
A guaranteed ticket purchase program with an air travel bank (ATB) 
builds on the idea of obtaining binding monetary pledges from air transport users 
(businesses and individuals) that constitute a revenue guarantee for new or 
expanded air services. The local community is pre-purchasing airline tickets for 
future use. This financial commitment also serves as a signal to prospective 
airlines that there is local support for a specific air service initiative.  
 
2.1. Stakeholders  
Table I outlines the involved stakeholders and their roles. The ATB 
holds the escrow account with the monetary pledges, where the money is safely 
held in trust until it is deployed to pay for provided air services. Escrow generally 
refers to money held by a neutral and financially trusted third-party in a blocked 
account on behalf of transacting parties.  
An ATB program typically builds on a public-private partnership (PPP) 
as some stakeholders belong to the public sector, while others come from the 
private sector. Air services from a publicly owned airport are developed through a 
partnership with private businesses. To facilitate a PPP involving partners from 
the business community, the airport operator ought to get the support of the local 
chamber of commerce and/or a regional development agency. 
Table 1  
Stakeholders and their roles 
Stakeholder Primary role 
Bank (ATB) Holder of escrow account 
Local business community User of air service; pay money into escrow account  
Airline   Air service provider; receives money from escrow account   
Airport operator Service provider to airline; receives aeronautical non-aeronautical revenues (e.g. airport charges) 
Regional development agency 
and/or chamber of commerce 
Facilitator, acts as intermediary between airport 
operator and local business community 
Source: own representation  
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2.2. ATB execution  
 The execution of a guaranteed ticket purchase program with ATB 
typically involves the following steps:  
• Private businesses (and individuals) interested in supporting an air 
service initiative pledge money. 
• The money is deposited in an ATB. Funds are held by a commercial 
bank. Interests are paid. 
• ATB participants can use their funds to purchase tickets with the partner 
airline.  
• Airline ticket purchases with the partner airline made through the ATB 
are paid from ATB deposits.  
• ATB funds are restricted to payments for tickets with the partner airline. 
• The ATB program lasts for a specified period (e.g. 12 months).  
• Unspent funds are paid out to the airline at the end of the agreed period 
and in turn, the airline will issue travel vouchers. 
• If the airline pulls out before the end of the agreed travel period, the 
remaining funds are returned.   
  
Figure 1: Execution of a guaranteed ticket purchase program with ATB 
Source: own representation 
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Figure 1 visualizes the ATB approach. (1) The escrow agreement is 
signed between an air transport user (buyer) and an airline (seller) with the ATB 
acting as escrow agent. (2) The buyer deposits money in escrow. (3) ATB 
manages the account and (4) confirms to seller that the money has been received. 
(5) The required services are performed and (6) proof of delivery is sent to ATB. 
Finally, (7) ATB releases the money in escrow to seller after the release 
conditions described in the escrow agreement have been met. Hence, the seller is 
sure that the buyer has made the money available to the trusted third party. The 
buyer can be sure that the money will only be released as agreed in the escrow 
agreement. 
 
3. Alternative airport route development tools 
Airport route development is done through close co-operation between 
airports and airlines. The establishment of new or expanded air services is often 
accompanied by some form of incentive offered by airports to airlines. This 
includes a wide range of non-financial incentives to the airline - from the 
provision of market information to promotional activities by the airport operator - 
but also different types of financial incentives (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Overview of incentives for airport route development 
Source: own representation 
 
3.1. Short-term impact on airport profits 
Financial incentives can be divided into direct payments (payments per 
flight or passenger, marketing budget), discounts on airport charges and risk 
sharing agreements (STRAIR 2005, Fichert/Klophaus 2011). The short-term 
impact of direct payments as well as discounts on airport charges is negative on 
the operating result of an airport operator. Losses of publicly owned or financed 
airport operators are typically covered by some sort of taxpayer-funded resources. 
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Such use of public money can be an area of controversy. An advantage of well- 
structured risk sharing agreements is to avoid this negative influence on airport 
profits. Tools in risk sharing between airports and airlines are revenue shortfall 
guarantees and guaranteed ticket purchase programs with air travel banks 
(ATBs). A revenue shortfall guarantee only leads to payments when the airline’s 
revenue for a specified time period is less than the minimum revenue established 
by contract. The ATB approach avoids payments between airports and airlines 
altogether. 
 
3.2. Regulatory issues 
Financial incentives may lead to operating losses of airport operators, if 
not covered by some sort of funding. Public funding, i.e. the use of taxpayer-
funded resources, as a state aid to airports is scrutinized by regulatory authorities. 
Start-up aid and permanent aid can be distinguished. Permanent aid might be 
justifiable for the provision of so-called “essential” air services. Examples for 
such support programs based on public funding to support a minimal level of 
scheduled air service to rural communities are the Essential Air Service (EAS) 
program and the Small Community Air Service Development Program 
(SCASDP) in the US and the Public Service Obligation (PSO) program in the 
EU. Such government intervention in form of financial assistance to small 
communities in order to enhance the level of air service is based on the 
assumption that routes from these communities cannot be profitable in a free 
market and are therefore not viable. The present paper departs from this basic 
assumption, claiming that there is latent demand and revenue that is adequate for 
a continued air service once started. Hence, the deployment of ATBs for the start-
up of new routes avoids communities lobbying for public financial support which 
inherently leads these communities to overstate demand.  
Start-up aid is scrutinized by authorities for distorting effects on 
competition. In February 2014, the European Commission adopted new 
guidelines for state aid to airports and airlines, designed to ensure the mobility of 
citizens while minimizing distortions of competition in Europe’s Single Aviation 
Market (European Commission, 2014). According to the new EU guidelines, 
start-up aid with public money may be granted for the launch of new routes from 
airports with annual passenger traffic of less than 3 million, if certain 
compatibility conditions and notification requirements are met. The compatibility 
conditions include that the amount of aid received represents only up to 50% of 
the airport charges and also the existence of an ex ante business plan, showing 
profitability of the route after at least 3 years. On a case-by-case basis, start-up 
state-aid may also be granted to airports with between 3 and 5 million passengers. 
Only in peripheral regions, start-up state-aid may be granted irrespectively of the 
airport size.  
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There is much uncertainty about the legal practice of these guidelines. 
Notification procedures, i.e. the process of getting approval for state aid, are time-
consuming and often involve costly legal advice. The ATB approach promises to 
avoid many of the aforementioned time-consuming regulatory and legal issues 
associated with public financing and state aid which also represent a significant 
financial risk to the involved parties. 
 
4. Economic success factors 
While a plethora of economic impact studies have emphasized the value 
of air services as a location factor for business development (see, for instance, 
Button et al., 2010), the use of public money for developing air services is still an 
area of controversy. In addition, public financing might simply be unavailable or 
only available in conjunction with restrictive conditions. A guaranteed ticket 
purchase program with ATB does not use public money if all entities that pre-
purchase tickets belong to the private sector. However, sometimes it is difficult to 
determine whether a business is part of the public sector or the private sector. 
Besides legal ownership, economic ownership also matters as a criterion, i.e. how 
the business is controlled and mainly financed needs to be considered. This is not 
necessarily determined by the shares held by the government (Lienert, 2009). 
Most regional development agencies, including tourism authorities, are controlled 
and financed by federal, state or local government and, thus, belong to the public 
sector. It may be more advisable if such entities do not pre-purchase tickets as 
part of the ATB concept in order to avoid issues with state aid regulation, 
resulting from mixed financing of money pledges.  
 
4.1. ATB indicates lower limit for demand  
Not only the raised amount of pledges is important, but an ATB 
initiative as such is a signal to a prospective airline that conveys some 
information on local interest and demand for an improved air service. Only 
if a business community has a true interest in a given route development, 
will an ATB receive significant amounts of money pledges, as the money in 
the ATB is lost to the private businesses (and individuals) if not used for air 
travel. Unspent money at the end of the agreed period is typically paid out 
to the airline. That is why rather conservative pledges are to be expected, 
even if the escrow agreement requires the airline to issue travel vouchers at 
the corresponding value of the remaining deposit. Hence, the total amount 
of money in the ATB gives a lower estimate of revenue which the airline 
can expect during the period (e.g. 12 months) specified in the escrow 
agreement. It is also unlikely that the level of demand represented by the 




4.2. Avoidance of the public goods dilemma  
Even if there is a strong community interest in expanded air transport 
services to strengthen local business and economic activity, the success of an 
ATB initiative still depends on the avoidance of a public goods dilemma, linked 
to the free rider problem. The required commitment of a business community is 
an outcome based on the individual decisions of private businesses asked to pay 
money into an ATB. These businesses will weigh up individual interests against 
the collective interest in scheduled air services which can be considered as public 
goods in a broader sense, as scheduled air services are open to use by the general 
public, i.e. any business has access in principal, without reducing the availability 
to other businesses. Any participation in an ATB is time-consuming and involves 
transaction costs on top of the payments for tickets. Hence, potential users of new 
or expanded air services can save time and money by not contributing and 
expecting other businesses (or individuals) to provide the necessary money 
pledges.  
To overcome the free rider problem as a hindrance to the success of an 
ATB initiative, the following measures by the airport operator, the regional 
development agency and/or the chamber of commerce are conceivable:    
• Address only businesses in the surroundings of an airport known to be 
heavy air transport users, 
• Provide simple execution procedures and efficient communication in 
order to reduce transaction costs for businesses,   
• Appeal to companies’ social responsibility, 
• Arrange for matching contributions with public funds. 
The presence of companies with significant year-around air travel 
demand in the airport’s vicinity is probably the most basic prerequisite for any 
successful ATB initiative. It is less promising to target heavy users at the opposite 
end of a projected air route as the inclusion of businesses, which might even be 
located in a different country, increases transaction costs for ATB agreements. 
Further, for obvious reasons, it is more difficult to appeal to a company’s social 
responsibility in connection with a distant community.  
 
4.3. Support by regional development agency and/or chamber 
of commerce 
In order to properly address the relevant companies within a region and 
to appeal to their social responsibility, the airport operator should try to get the 
support of the local regional development agency and/or chamber of commerce. 
These institutions can facilitate the establishment of an ATB by acting as 
intermediaries between the airport operator and the local business community. 
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For example, a chamber of commerce can make use of regular meetings and 
established communication channels within its network of chamber members. 
Beyond their coordinating role, these institutions might arrange for matching 
contributions with public funds. However, such mixed funding of start-up aid for 
route development might cause the regulatory issues that the ATB approach 
promises to avoid with solely private financing.  
 
4.4. Value proposition to the local businesses community 
On the outset of an ATB initiative, not all parameters of an aspired new 
or expanded service are fixed. For example, there might be uncertainty as to the 
amount of tickets a pledge will buy, but also other services attributes. Clearly, it 
is easier to provide reliable information on ticket prices and service attributes 
such as frequencies, arrival and departure times or aircraft types for stand-alone 
point-to-point routes. However, the key route development objective at smaller 
airports is often to gain access to a hub airport. Hub access offers the business 
community surrounding a smaller airport not only a point-to-point service into the 
hub airport but also connecting services to various destinations. Average fares 
will differ with the respective travel destination. Hence, providing hub access 
offers greater benefits to the local business community than a stand-alone point-
to-point service, but the additional benefits resulting from connecting flights are 
more difficult to assess for prospective users. 
 
4.5. No nearby airports with competing scheduled air services  
The success of any ATB initiative also depends on existing travel 
alternatives. There should be no nearby airports with competing scheduled air 
services. For short-haul travel, the availability of other modes of transportation 
also needs to be considered. In practice, some discussion might result from 
answering the question on what constitutes a nearby airport and/or competing 
scheduled air services. Start-up aid with public funding is not compatible with the 
new EU Guidelines on state-aid to airports and airlines when a connection which 
will be operated by the new air route is already operated by a high-speed rail 
service or is available from another airport in the same catchment area under 
comparable conditions (European Commission, 2014). According to the EU 
guidelines, the catchment area of an airport is defined as a geographic market 
boundary that is normally set at around 100 kilometers or around 60 minutes 
traveling time by car, bus, train or high-speed train. If another airport with 
competing scheduled air services can be reached in less than 60 minutes by car, it 





4.6. Sufficient financial commitment to influence airline 
network planning 
The financial commitment by a local business community needs to be 
significant from an airline’s point of view. In order to have an impact on airport 
route development, a total amount of €100,000 in an ATB will probably not be 
sufficient as the following simple calculation shows: If an average return fare of a 
voucher of €300 is assumed, €100,000 corresponds to less than one passenger on 
a new year-around service with two daily frequencies. Even an amount of 
€2,000,000 corresponds only to approximately 10 passengers per flight which is 
not much for an aircraft the size of a Boeing B737 or an Airbus A320. There are 
airlines operating small twin-turboprop (e.g. the British Aerospace Jetstream 31, 
having a seat capacity of 19 seats). However, these airlines require high yields for 
return tickets to allow for route profitability and, subsequently, a sustainable 
operation. Alternatively, starting a route offering hub access and long-haul 
connections might not require as many daily frequencies as a stand-alone service. 
For example, Turkish Airlines offers access to its Istanbul hub from German 
regional airports starting with three frequencies per week. An escrow amount of 
€2,000,000 and an assumed average return fare of €600 - as a result from the mix 
of fares for travel into the hub and beyond to long-haul destinations - would then 
correspond to more than 20 passengers per flight to/from the airport of the ATB 
community. This might influence airline network planning considering that the 
ATB gives a lower limit for the revenue the airline can expect from its service 
offering. Therefore, ATBs might be more promising for routes offering hub 
access than for stand-alone point-to-point services.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
A guaranteed ticket purchase program with air travel bank (ATB) is 
based on the financial commitment of the business community surrounding an 
airport. It is a form of private financing of airport route development contrary to, 
for example, cost subsidies like discounts on airport charges covered with 
taxpayer-funded resources. Hence, it is especially appealing for airport operators 
when public funding for route developments is not available or if the acquisition 
of public financing is considered to take up too much time or to consume too 
many resources. ATBs as public-private partnerships with the local business 
community may give airport managers some leverage in the struggle to develop 
air services while at the same time, it is no state aid as no public money is spent 
for route development.  
In comparison with offering revenue guarantees as another type of risk 
sharing agreement that in principal can be funded completely with private money 
an ATB has several advantages as a financial incentive to develop air services 
from a smaller airport: it is less risky for businesses depositing money in escrow 
accounts, as they get air travel for their money and there is a clearer connection 
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between costs and benefits that tends to diminish a potential free rider problem. A 
guaranteed ticket purchase program also indicates existing demand for new air 
services. There are fundamental success factors for ATB initiatives such as 
receiving support from the regional development agency and/or the local chamber 
of commerce, a clear value proposition to the targeted businesses from the 
beginning of an ATB initiative, no nearby airports with competing scheduled air 
services and a total amount of money pledges that is sufficient to actually 
influence airline network planning.  
The ATB concept is appropriate if there is confidence in the level of 
latent demand that - once revealed - sustains the new air services. Documented 
failures of guaranteed ticket purchase programs with ATB may be the result of an 
overestimated demand which leads air services to be discontinued at the end of 
the ATB contract period. Nevertheless, financial commitments by potential users 
of new or expanded air services are certainly more reliable predictors of 
commercially viable air services in competitive markets than government 
subsidies.   
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